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THE ROLE OF FISCAL POLICY IN 
RESILIENCE BUILDING: EXPERIENCES 
OF PACIFIC ISLAND COUNTRIES 
T.K. Jayaraman 
Abstract. The Pacific Island Countries (PICs) are vulnerable to 
external shocks including natural disasters. Aside from their 
economic openness, narrow range of exports and dependency on 
strategic imports, several of them have faced adverse conditions 
during recent years such as fall in demand for primary commodities 
and services, including tourism. Furthermore, the challenges of 
increased globalisation have been testing their capacity to withstand 
the risks imposed by the vulnerable nature of their economies. 
However, there are also notable examples of successful small states, 
which have overcome these handicaps by nurturing economic 
resilience through sound macroeconomic management. Fiscal 
policy plays a critical role in ensuring macroeconomic stability. This 
chapter reviews recent trends in fiscal performance and investigates 
problem areas of fiscal adjustment. 
1. Introduction 
In recent years small states have been facing adverse economic 
conditions, which have been hurting their economic growth and in some 
cases halting their progress towards achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). Notably, the average annual growth rates 
in per capita real income in many Pacific Island Countries (PICs) during 
the past decade (1995-2004) have been less than 2 percent, which is the 
benchmark rate required to halve the incidence of poverty by 2015 (Dollar 
and Kraay, 2001; AusAID, 2005). External shocks including a decline in 
terms of trade for primary exports, volatility in aid receipts as well as 
natural resource rent incomes such as revenue from fishing licenses, 
and a higher than usual occurrences in recent years of natural disasters 
have all been cited as reasons behind the lacklustre economic 
performance of small island states in general and of PI Cs in particular. 
The impending discontinuance by the end of 2007 of the preferential 
treatment accorded by the European Union (EU) to sugar and other 
primary exports, hitherto enjoyed under various protocols and 
agreements for the past four decades, has also cast a shadow of gloom 
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across the region. Despite a notice of more than five years given by the 
EU for improving productivity at farm level and raising efficiency in 
processing at factory level towards enabling them to withstand 
competition from exporters from larger countries, PICs have failed to 
quickly restructure their ailing export industries. 
In these circumstances, nurturing economic resilience through 
maintaining macroeconomic stability as well as stepping up the rate of 
economic growth for raising per-capita incomes has posed major 
challenges to PICs.1 They have been struggling to marshall all their 
available resources and trying to utilise the available policy tools, namely 
exchange rate, fiscal and monetary policies to promote growth and 
development. In the case of those PICs which have chosen to adopt 
currencies of metropolitan countries as legal tender, there is much less 
manoeuvrability, as they have no control over exchange rates. 
In pursuit of higher economic growth, expansionary fiscal policy measures 
in the midst of stagnant tax revenues, compounded by volatility in both 
aid inflows and natural resource rent incomes have given rise to budget 
and external current account deficits. The emergence of these twin deficits 
has been exercising considerable pressures on exchange rates. In these 
circumstances, fiscal adjustment measures are likely to be painful. Aside 
from slowing down their efforts toward the achievement of MDGs, 
expenditure cuts adversely affect critical issues such as health, education 
and the creation and maintenance of physical assets. 
The objective of the chapter is to undertake a review of the fiscal 
performance in PICs and evaluate their progress towards achieving a 
higher degree of nurtured resilience. The chapter is organised as follows: 
the second section provides an overview of fiscal trends in PICs; the 
third section specifically evaluates fiscal adjustment measures in regard 
to expenditure controls, revenue mobilisation efforts and debt 
management in PICs; and the fourth and final section presents a 
summary. 
2. Fiscal Trends in Pacific Island Countries 
Among the 14 PICs (see Table 1 for the selected social and economic key 
indicators) which are members of the regional organisation known as 
the Pacific Forum, only one country, namely Papua New Guinea (PNG) 
has an independent, floating currency (see Table 2.). 
1 For a detailed treatment of the topics on vulnerability and nurturing economic resilience 
of small states, see Briguglio (1995, 2004) and Jayaraman (2006). 
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Table 1 
Selected Economic and Social Indicators 
Per Aid 
Capita per Aid 
Population Area GDP HDI Capita %of %of 
('000) ('000) US$ Rank US$ GDP GDP 
2004 Km2 2004 2003 2004 1990 2004 
Cook Islands 19 0.2 2,651 62 490 NA 28.0 
Fiji 841 18.3 2,720 92 76 3.9 2.6 
Fed States of Micronesia 110 0.7 2,300 120 787 NA 36.0 
Kiribati 98 0.7 970 129 171 22.5 17.8 
Palau 20 0.5 6,870 NA 978 NA 15.0 
Papua New Guinea 5,722 462.0 560 137 46 7.2 7.6 
Republic of Marshall Is. 61 0.2 2,320 121 836 49.6 37.4 
Samoa 184 2.8 1,840 74 167 42.6 8.2 
Solomon Islands 468 28.9 560 128 262 21.7 47.8 
Tonga 102 0.7 1,360 54 109 26.3 9.1 
Tuvalu 11 0.003 345 118 260 47.2 45.0 
Vanuatu 207 12.2 1,390 118 162 33.0 12.4 
Source: Commonwealth Secretariat (2000; 2006) 
Table 2 
Pacific Island Countries 
Real GDP Growth Rate Inflation 
1995-2005 2001-2005 1995-2005 2001-2005 
(%) (%) (%) (%) 
A. Countries with no separate legal tender: 
Cook Islands 3.0 4.3 
Kiribati 3.0 -0.2 
FSM 0.9 
Palau 2.8 1.4 
RMI -0.6 3.0 
Tuvalu 2.9 6.4 
2.7 
1.9 
1.8 
2.0 
3.2 
5.6 
B. Countries with currencies pegged to a basket of currencies: 
2.9 
1.9 
1.3 
1.3 
1.3 
3.0 
Fiji 2.3 2.6 3.1 2.9 
Samoa 4.1 4.2 3.8 5.3 
Solomon Islands -0.04 0.8 8.8 8.0 
Tonga 2.2 2.1 6.0 10.2 
Vanuatu 2.2 0.4 2.3 2.2 
C. Country with floating exchange rates: 
PNG 1.1 1.7 10.7 8.1 
Source: UNESCAP (2006) and author's calculations 
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Out of the remaining 13, eight PICs (Cook Islands, Federated States of 
Micronesia, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Republic of Marshall Islands, 
and Tuvalu) are dollarised countries, having adopted the currencies of 
Australia, New Zealand or the United States. The rest (Fiji, Samoa, Solomon 
Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu) have exchange rates pegged to a trade 
weighted composite basket of currencies of their major trading partners. 
Dominance of Fiscal Policy 
In the case of PICs, differences in exchange rate regimes did not have a 
significant impact on inflation levels (see Table 2). This is confirmed by 
Rosales (2001). The reason behind this phenomenon appears to be that 
all PI Cs have been sourcing their imports from Australia, New Zealand 
and the United States (US), whose central banks have been targeting 
inflation, which explains the low inflation in PICs. 
It is well known that under fixed exchange rate regimes, the role of 
monetary policy is less effective. In the past, the existence of exchange 
controls had enabled monetary policy to be of some use (Khatkhate and 
Short, 1980). With increased liberalisation since the late 1980s and the 
near total dismantling of exchange controls especially in regard to the 
current account, monetary policy is not likely to play any effective role. 
Furthermore, within the context of the nascent money and capital 
markets in all PICs, the transmission mechanism of monetary policy 
has been found to be weak. A recent study on the effectiveness of fiscal 
and monetary policies on Fiji's economic growth covering the period 
1970-20022 found an absence of any relationship in the short-run between 
monetary policy and economic growth, although there existed a long-
term relationship between growth and fiscal and monetary policies. In 
the short run, the economic growth of Fiji was positively influenced only 
by fiscal policy (Dahalan and Jayaraman, 2006). 
It appears that fiscal policy has been the foremost policy tool for PICs.3 
What is striking is that overall fiscal balances4 of all PICs, with the 
2 The study, which covered the period 1970-2002 employed real government expenditure 
and real net foreign assets respectively representing fiscal policy and monetary policy. 
3 The findings by Easterly and Rebelo (1993) in their study of advanced countries are 
relevant for PICs as well. They are (i) the share of public investment in transport and 
communications is robustly correlated with growth in income; (ii) the government's 
budget surplus is correlated with growth in income and private sector investment; (iii) 
government revenues rise as a proportion of GDP with a rise in per-capita income; and 
(iv) a rise in income is associated with a tall in the share of the international trade taxes 
in total government revenues. 
4 This paper uses the overall balance (total government revenue including grants minus 
total expenditure including interest payments) rather than the primary balance (same 
as the overall balance but excluding interest payments). (continued next page) 
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exception of the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), which along 
with two other former UN Trust Territories administered by the US has 
been receiving substantial funds for budget support under the Compacts 
of Free Association (the Compact) from the US5 , have been negative 
(see Table 3, next page). 
Structural rigidities in budgets 
The primary reason behind the persistent fiscal deficits in PICs can be 
attributed to structural rigidities in their budgets. The revenue resource 
bases are narrow in all PICs. Being dependent on taxes on imports and 
exports, government revenues, which include grants, are subject to 
volatility. Direct tax revenues of PICs average about 17 percent to 25 
percent of GDP each year. Vanuatu does not have direct taxation of any 
kind, either on personal or corporate income or estate duty. Consequently, 
it has to depend only on indirect taxes, dominated by taxes on consumption 
of goods and services, excise and value added taxes (VAT), besides taxes 
on international trade. In other PICs, direct taxes, except for PNC, bring 
in less than 10 percent of GDP (see Appendix 1). The shares of non-tax 
revenues in GDP are much larger in Kiribati and Tuvalu. They ranged 
from 50 percent to 54 percent. In 2006, fishing license fees accounted for 
87 percent of Kiribati's non-tax revenues in 2006 and 43 percent of total 
government revenues. Since resource rent income receipts varied from 
year to year, we observe high volatility in total government revenues of 
Kiribati. In the case of Compact countries, the grants received from the 
US being a larger component of revenue receipts, total government 
revenues as proportions of GDP are much higher, ranging from 69 percent 
in case of the Marshall Islands to 72 percent in Palau. 
On the expenditure front, the structural rigidities have been equally 
insurmountable. They emanate from the traditional image of the 
government being the biggest employer in the formal sector as well as 
• (Continued from previous page) The Primary balance which would have been more 
appropriate as it reflects the country's fiscal effort (Daniel et al., 2006) to generate surpluses 
(Sahay, 2004), and this is a critical variable for debt sustainability analysis. However data 
on interest payments are not available on a time series basis for all PI Cs. 
5 The Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) along with Federated States of Micronesia 
(FSM) and Palau, which were once United Nations Trust Territories and administered by 
the United States, have been receiving assistance from the US under respective Compacts of 
Free Association (the Compact) ever since they became independent sovereign nations. Under 
Compact I (1986-2001), RMI received US$640 million, which covered the government 
recurrent and capital expenditures. Under Compact II, (2004-2023), RMI would continue to 
receive US$ 42.7 million (nearly 40 percent of GDP). Similarly, FSM under Compact I (1987-
2001 ), received aimual cash grants of US$ 97.9 million during 1987-91, $91.1 million during 
1992-96 and US$ 79.2during1997-2001. Under Compact II (2004-2023), FSM would receive 
US$ 92.7 million per year. Palau, which became independent in 1994, is now covered under 
a 50-year Compact during which it would receive nearly US$ 620 million. 
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Table 3 
PICs: Government Revenue, Expenditure and Overall Balance 
Govt. Revenue Govt Expend. Overall Balance 
%ofGDP as%ofGDP as %ofGDP 
Average Std Dev Average Std Dev Average Std Dev 
1988-2005 
Fiji 26.4 2.4 30.5 2.2 -4.1 1.8 
FSM 71.6 10.2 73.9 10.7 -2.3 53.0 
Kiribati 111.6 20.1 122.7 23.4 -11.1 19.9 
PNG 24.7 3.9 30.2 2.5 -5.5 1.9 
RMI 68.8 9.2 64.2 11.1 4.6 11.2 
Samoa 38.5 6.7 41.9 14.9 -3.4 7.2 
Solomon Is 24.5 3.2 36.3 2.8 -11.8 3.5 
Tonga 29.8 2.6 30.4 3.1 -0.6 3.7 
Vanuatu 22.3 2.3 28.2 6.5 -5.9 3.2 
1988-1999 
Fiji 26.8 2.7 30.4 2.6 -3.6 2.0 
FSM 77.2 4.3 80.4 5.9 -3.2 4.1 
Kiribati 103.7 20.7 107.7 9.8 -4.0 16.9 
PNG 23.9 1.7 30.1 2.6 -6.2 2.0 
RMI 74.2 4.6 67.6 18.6 6.6 15.9 
Samoa 31.8 7.4 47.2 17.8 -15.4 9.2 
Solomon ls 20.9 4.3 35.7 5.3 -14.8 8.6 
Tonga 28.2 1.1 29.3 1.5 -1.1 1.6 
Vanuatu 20.3 0.9 23.9 2.9 -3.6 2.4 
2000-2005 
Fiji 25.3 0.9 30.3 1.1 -5.0 1.1 
FSM 63.5 9.1 65.0 8.1 -1.5 7.1 
Kiribati 120.7 16.5 140.2 22.9 -19.5 16.5 
PNG 26.4 6.4 30.4 2.5 -4.0 1.9 
RMI 64.3 9.9 61.2 5.4 3.1 6.5 
Samoa 33.0 1.1 34.9 5.7 -1.9 0.8 
Solomon ls 28.2 4.4 30.6 2.9 -2.4 4.5 
Tonga 30.5 2.7 32.3 3.2 -1.8 4.4 
Vanuatu 23.4 2.1 30.4 6.8 -7.0 2.9 
Source: Author's Calculations and Asian Development Bank (2006) 
provider of services. Table 3 presents government expenditures as 
proportion of GDP for selected PICs. The high ratios in PICs such as 
Kiribati (123 percent), Federated States of Micronesia (74 percent), and 
the Republic of the Marshall Islands (84 percent) during 1988-2005 reflect 
the situation that PlCs with small populations are less able to realise 
scale economies in the provision of public goods and services. These 
PI Cs are also recipients of high per capita aid which facilitate funding of 
larger public sectors. A study by the US General Accounting Office 
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reported that the funds under the first Compacts in case of the Marshall 
Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia mainly financed 
government consumption and high government wages. This was not in 
line with the primary objective of Compact, which was to enable the 
recipient countries to reach self-sufficiency and self-reliance. 
Although reforms have begun in the late 1990s with a view to trimming 
the civil service, the public sector wage bill has continued to remain high. 
For example, in Fiji, which witnessed the introduction of reforms in the 
late 1980s following the two coups in 1987, the wages and salaries 
component has still been around 45 percent of the total expenditure. The 
operating expenditures, which are dominated by wages and related travel 
and other housekeeping expenses, are about 80 percent of total 
expenditure. Such a high proportion of total expenditures have eaten into 
government resources, denying greater allocation to more critically needed 
investments in growth-enhancing capital projects Oayaraman and Choong, 
2006a). 
Fiscal Vulnerability Indicators 
Appendix 1, which presents some of the fiscal vulnerability indicators6, 
shows that overall fiscal balances have been negative for all countries, 
except the Marshall Islands which, as noted earlier, has been receiving 
substantial aid under the Compact I and IL The highest average negative 
overall balance during the six-year period 2000-2005 was recorded in 
the case of Kiribati (20 percent of GDP), followed by Vanuatu (7 percent 
of GDP) and Fiji (5 percent of GDP). While fiscal deficits were financed 
in Kiribati by a substantial drawdown from the Revenue Equalisation 
Reserve Fund (RERF)7 and in Tuvalu by similar recourse to the Tuvalu 
Trust Fund (TTF), Fiji's fiscal deficits were financed entirely by domestic 
6 The International Monetary Fund, which conducts periodical surveys of economic and 
financial conditions of its member countries, as part of Article IV consultations, has developed 
certain indicators to assess fiscal performance. These indicators generally include annual 
overall budget balance as percentage of GDP, current account in the balance of payments, 
as a percentage of GDP, international reserves for countries under fixed exchange rate regimes 
as equivalent to certain number of months of imports, outstanding foreign debt stock as a 
percentage of GDP and annual debt servicing expenditure as a percent of total earnings 
from exports of goods and services. The indicators facilitate assessment of economic health 
of the economy. There is no sanctity attached to any number. The desirable indicators, such 
as 3 percent of GDP for overall fiscal balance, six month-imports equivalent as international 
reserves as requirement or a limit of 50 percent of GDP as the total debt of a country are just 
reminders to governments. lf an md1cator is above the general acceptable level, it should 
cause concern to policymakers as well as to international funding agencies which are 
interested in the recovery of loans extended to member countries. 
7 The RERF was set up in 1956, for receiving and holding royalties collected from phosphate 
mining companies. Its funds were invested in overseas securities. (continued next page) 
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borrowing until 2005. In September 2006, for the first time Fiji resorted 
to external borrowing in the international bond market for financing 
the budget deficit. 
In the past two decades, central bank financing of fiscal deficits was not 
uncommon. Deficits in PNG, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu were 
financed through borrowing from the central bank. For example, PNG' s 
large budget deficits of the mid-1990s, which were incurred due to 
defence spending, tax reductions, agricultural subsidies, and persistent 
expenditure overruns, were monetised by its central bank. Central bank 
autonomy was established by a much needed legislation only much later 
in 2000 (Marciniak, 2006). In Vanuatu, the unsubscribed government 
bonds for financing the purchase of an aircraft for the government-owned 
airline, Air Vanuatu, were picked up by Reserve Bank of Vanuatu 
(Jayaraman, 1998). Restoration of central bank autonomy through 
legislation as well as a greater appreciation of the need for administrative 
measures to promote fiscal and monetary policies coordination (Ali and 
Jayaraman, 2001) in the latter part of last decade seem to have lessened 
the incidence of monetisation of fiscal deficits in recent years. 
Financing Fiscal Deficits 
Consequently, PICs now look to the usual avenues of funding fiscal 
deficits, which are domestic public borrowing and loans from external 
funding agencies. Fiji, which is above the threshold level of income per 
capita, is not eligible for borrowing on concessional terms from 
international funding agencies including the Asian Development Bank 
and the World Bank. However, those PICs which were eligible for loans 
on soft terms took considerable advantage of such facilities. The result 
is that government debt for most PICs like Samoa is external. Although 
Samoa's government debt is seemingly high at 50 percent of GDP in 
2005, its debt burden was relatively small, since debt-servicing costs were 
below 8 percent of exports of goods and services. On the other hand, Fiji 
financed it fiscal deficits by domestic borrowing, mostly from the National 
Provident Fund, continuously for a six-year period (2001-2006). Fiji's total 
government debt in 2006 was 53 percent of GDP. With contingent liabilities 
such as guaranteed debt of state-owned enterprises and other 
undertakings, the debt ratio was higher at around 60 percent of GDP. 
7 (Continued from previous page) In 1996, parliament laid down that value of RERF per 
capita should be kept constant for futurP gPnPrntions. Tlw m;ukPt vril11P of RF.RF rosP 
from A$ 97.1 million in 1984 to A$666 million in October 2006 (ADB, 2007). Between 1997 
and 2007, annual average drawdowns were limited to 5.6 percent of GDP and value of 
RERF assets per capita rose in real terms by 55 percent. Expansionary fiscal spending 
during next three years led to heavy draw downs from RERF, reaching 25 percent of GDP 
(Feyzioglu, 2006). 
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External Debt 
Fiji's external debt was all along kept deliberately low at around 10 
percent of GDP until 2006 by its past policies of minimal borrowing 
from international funding agencies. Utilising the favourable credit 
rating,8 Fiji carried out its first ever bond issue in international bond 
markets in September 2006, the issue size being at US$150 million with 
the stated objective that the loan proceeds would be for meeting the 
2007 budget deficit requirements. The bond maturity period was for 
five years and the coupon payment amounted to 7 percent of the face 
value. 
Fiscal deficits either funded by continuous borrowing or by drawing 
down funds leads to a rise in aggregate demand, which eventually spills 
over into demand for foreign goods and services. Were it not for 
substantial aid inflows and remittances, the current account balances in 
several PICs would have become negative. Since Fiji is not a major 
recipient of aid (Table 1), current account deficits became chronic and 
increasing during 2001-2005, despite a surge in remittances since 2003. 
Table 4 presents data relating to budget, trade and current account 
balances for selected PICs. 
Table 4 
Budget, Trade and Current Account Balances of Selected Countries 
(Averages as% of GDP) 
Budget Balance Trade Balance Cur. Accnt Balance 
tj< 0\ tj< tj< 0\ tj< tj< 0\ tj< 
0\ 0\ 0 0\ 0\ 0 0\ 0\ 0 
I I I I I I I I I 
0 L() 0 0 L() 0 0 L() 0 
0\ 0\ 0 0\ 0\ 0 0\ 0\ 0 
0\ 0\ 0 0\ 0\ 0 0\ 0\ 0 
,-< ,-< N ,-< ,-< N ,-< ,-< N 
Fiji -3.2 -3.2 -5.1 -14.4 -11.6 -17.0 -2.1 -0.2 -7.0 
PNC -3.7 -0.8 -1.5 +14.7 +21.0 +26.5 +3.8 +4.6 +4.3 
Samoa -10.5 -0.2 -1.3 -68.3 -38.7 -41.4 -13.2 +5.0 -0.2 
Solomon Is -6.1 -0.9 -5.8 -0.9 +2.1 -1.1 -6.6 +1.1 +1.4 
Tonga 0.0 -1.1 -1.1 -30.0 +2.1 -35.1 +1.5 -6.7 -2.2 
Vanuatu -4.6 -3.2 -2.7 -30.3 -20.2 -23.8 -7.2 -8.8 -4.6 
Source: Asian Development Bank (2006) and author's calculations 
8 Fiji's credit rating had, however, fallen since December 2006, due to a military coup and 
continuing distrust in the interim government by the international community. In late 
2006, Standard & Poor's lowered Fiji's foreign currency and local credit rating to B+ and 
BB- from BB+ and BB respectively. In March 2007, the ratings were further lowered to B 
and B+ respectively (Reserve Bank of Fiji, 2006b). 
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With the exception of PNG, which ran trade surpluses due to commodity 
price booms in recent years, and Solomon Islands, which received 
substantial aid during 2001-2004, the other four major island countries 
experienced sizeable current account deficits. 
Twin Deficit Hypothesis 
Although empirical evidence obtained elsewhere is not conclusive 
enough to establish the popular twin deposit hypothesis that fiscal 
developments are the driving force behind trends in current account 
balances (IMF, 2001; Normandin, 1999), two recent studies in regard to 
PICs (Jayaraman and Choong 2007; 2008) have shown the existence of 
twin deficits in Fiji and Vanuatu. While the persistent fiscal deficits were 
financed from increased public borrowing, the current account deficits 
were financed under fixed exchange rate regimes by a steady drawdown 
from the international reserves. Fiji's reserves position weakened 
gradually from 2002 (6.3 months of import cover) to 2006 (3.2 months of 
imports cover). 
As Fiji's international reserves were declining since 2002, pressures were 
mounting on the exchange rate, leading to speculative attacks during 
the second half of 2006, as rumours were rife about an imminent 
devaluation. It was then clear that fiscal deficits and the build-up of 
public debt of record size would eventually take a toll on the country's 
currency (Jayaraman and Choong, 2006b ). Fiji's monetary authority, the 
Reserve Bank of Fiji (RBF) imposed exchange controls on capital 
transactions in December 2006 and introduced credit ceilings along with 
increases in interest rates on RBF lending facilities to commercial banks 
(RBF, 2006c). 
Characteristics of Macroeconomic Instability 
Fiji's macroeconomic situation of 2006 was similar to the one that 
prevailed in PNG in the 1990s. The PNG pursued expansionary fiscal 
policies during the four years preceding the 1997 general elections, which 
included tax reductions, agricultural export subsidies, persistent 
expenditure excesses, and regular transfers to unviable state-owned 
enterprises. PNG's government debt rose to 60 percent of GDP in 1996 
from 45 percent in 1990. Balance of payment crises ensued and the 
international reserves dwindled at one point to a half-month of non-
mineral imports (Marciniak, 2006). Events forced PNG to resort to a 
floating exchange rate regime, which delivered a measure of external 
stability, though only for a short period. A sharp contraction in exports 
due to drought in 1997 and the Asian financial crisis caused another 
current account cns1s. Budgetary reforms introduced m 1999 restored 
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some stability. However, in the months leading up to the 2002 elections, 
fiscal excesses were again indulged in by the incumbent government to 
recapture power, which led to the deterioration of both budget and 
current account balances. After three years of negative growth, PNC' s 
economy picked up in 2005, aided by sensible policies and an export 
boom. PNG' s international reserves position improved and reached 
record levels, at higher than 5 months import cover. 
The case of Solomon Islands is similar to that of PNG. The country 
experienced three decades of fiscal imbalances since becoming 
independent in 1978. The reasons were stagnant revenues, often eroded 
by tax and customs exemptions and a rise in current expenditures due 
to increases in wages and salaries, transfers to local governments and 
inadequate expenditure controls. There was a recovery in the external 
current account during the first half of the 1990s primarily due to 
unprecedented logging and timber exports, which was however only 
short-lived. The ethnic conflict of 1999 and its aftermath resulted in 
negative growth for the next three years. The fiscal deficit reached a 
high of 12 percent of GDP in 2001, consequent to a decline in exports 
induced by the Asian financial crisis and civil strife. The international 
reserves position fell to its weakest-ever level (2 months of import cover) 
in the same year. The economy recovered soon after the Regional 
Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands, led by Australia and other 
donors, was mounted in 2003. Bilateral donors on behalf of Solomon 
Islands settled the outstanding debt servicing obligations to international 
funding agencies. Improvements in fiscal management since 2003 
stabilised the economy and the fiscal position improved thereafter. 
In general, PI Cs continue to grapple with grave issues of macroeconomic 
instability since the beginning of the new Millennium due to 
expansionary fiscal policies. Stagnation in government revenues, lower 
natural resource rent incomes and declining aid inflows have further 
compounded the problem of growing fiscal deficits. These deficits, 
financed first by domestic borrowing including central bank credit and 
later by overseas borrowing, have serious repercussions on balance of 
payments, not very dissimilar to the ones observed in the Caribbean 
context in the mid-1990s (Hilaire, 2000). These include external current 
accounts slipping into deficits, followed by the plummeting of foreign 
reserves, with stresses on the servicing of foreign debt and on exchange 
rates. In these circumstances, the only feasible solution appears to be a 
programme of fiscal adjustment carried out in a sustained manner over 
the medium term. Although such efforts were initiated earlier in several 
PICs, they were often disrupted by the effects of unforeseen natural as 
well as man-made disasters, including coups. As noted by Kharnfula 
(2005) in his study on African countries, exogenous shocks, which are 
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often the major cause of economic volatility in small island states, have 
to be reckoned with as they endanger fiscal reform programmes. 
3. Fiscal Adjustment: Past Performance and Future Prospects 
In the current context of persistent twin deficits in PICs, the standard 
remedy (Daniel et al., 2006) is fiscal adjustment, which is expected to 
facilitate external adjustment as well. Giving a broader definition, Daniel 
et al. (2006) clarify that fiscal adjustment would mean a change in fiscal 
stance, either tightening or loosening, as the situation would warrant. The 
term fiscal consolidation, with reference to twin deficits, implies reducing 
government deficit and debt accumulation. 
Fiscal Consolidation 
Reducing government spending as a remedy to reduce annual fiscal 
imbalances and accumulation of debt is not as easy as expansionary 
spending. This was borne by public reactions in March 2007 to the 
initiatives announced by the interim government in Fiji with a view to 
put an end to the six-year (2001-2006) expansionary fiscal spending 
through heavy public (Jayaraman and Choong, 2007). The fiscal 
consolidation measures which were indicated in the interim 
government's revised budget for 2007 included a reduction in the 
operating expenditures through the trimming of the number of ministries 
and departments from 36to16, cuts in wages and salaries of civil servants 
by 5 percent across the board and downsizing the size of the civil service 
through lowering the retirement age from 60 to 55 and freezing vacant 
positions. The public reaction was that reduction in government 
spending would lead to recession. It was argued that if government 
applied brakes on public spending, even in pursuit of a well-intentioned 
attempt to balance the budget, the fall in aggregate demand would lead 
to unemployment and there would be an economic slowdown. 
Experiences in Industrial Countries 
Such fears were no doubt genuine, as fiscal consolidation in the short-
run has the potential to trigger a recession. However, recent empirical 
investigations of fiscal expansion and consolidation experiences in 
industrial countries (McDermott and Westcottt, 1996a) have shown that 
effects of a slowdown in the short-run would be offset by gains in the 
long run. The non-Keynesian economic literature based on neoclassical 
models (IMF, 1996; Alesina and Perotti, 1995a) argue that sustained fiscal 
adjustment in terms of budget and debt reduction would result in lower 
interest rates, depreciating exchange rates" positive expectational effects" 
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that would even swamp the traditional undesirable effects of fiscal 
contraction such as unemployment and recession (McDermott and 
Westcott, 1996b). 
The argument in favour of reduced government spending runs on the 
following lines: (i) a smaller budget would reduce the perceived risk 
that a government might depreciate its debt through high inflation in 
the future (paying off debt with cheaper money); (ii) a reduction in the 
perceived risk would then lead to a fall in interest rates; and (iii) this 
will be followed by a reduction in default risk premium interest rates, 
as budgetary consolidation would improve the image of government in 
terms of its solvency. It is further argued that a reduction of public 
expenditure especially through lower public salaries and wages would 
have an impact on the cost of labour in the private sector, engendering 
profitability and competitiveness (IMF, 2001; Alesina et al., 1998). Fiscal 
consolidation driven by lower expenditure would send out signals to 
households and businesses that future tax burdens would be lowered, 
thereby resulting in crowding-in effects on private sector demand.9 
There are no studies on the impact of fiscal adjustment in PICs 
comparable to McDermott and Westcott (1996a). The apparent reason is 
that such fiscal adjustment measures were not implemented on a 
sustained scale as in industrial countries. However, an important study 
by Gupta et al. (2004) taking into account fiscal adjustment episodes in 
29 developing countries in different regions under IMF-supported 
programmes in the 1990s shows that the success of fiscal adjustment, in 
terms of the persistence over time of its positive effects, is (i) positively 
determined by factors which include the reallocation of recurrent 
expenditures to productive capital projects; and (ii) negatively influenced 
by large outlays on wages and salaries. 
Fiscal adjustment measures include: (i) strengthening expenditure 
control and budget-monitoring; (ii) enhancing the efficiency of revenue 
systems; (iii) introducing measures to offset the volatility in revenues 
generated by non-tax revenue receipts and aid inflows; (iv) redirecting 
aid resources into capacity building investments by streamlining the 
civil service and reducing recurrent expenditures; (v) enhancing debt-
management practices; and (vi) improving foreign exchange earnings 
and maintaining a competitive real exchange rate so that external debt 
servicing does not pose undue problems in the long run. 
9 While noting that the non-Keynesian effects were important in those euro area countries 
characterised by high levels of government debt and large pubic sectors, IMF studies (1996, 
2001) observed that the impact of reduced fiscal spending on output in the short term is 
an area of some dispute. 
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Effective Expenditure Control 
Since revenue mobilisation in PI Cs is seriously constrained by structural 
rigidities, such as narrow revenue bases with heavy dependence on 
international trade taxes, fiscal consolidation efforts would necessarily 
have to be based on effective expenditure adjustments. One of the steps 
required is to reduce the wage bill. Since government is the major 
employer in the formal sector in the region, there is always a reluctance 
to downsize the civil service, in spite of the prevalence of ghost-
employees and high rates of absenteeism. Although it is being 
increasingly realised that a leaner civil service with adequate 
remuneration and incentives could be more efficient and productive, 
the ongoing efforts towards this aim are in general half-hearted, as they 
often involve redeployment of personnel within the public sector itself 
with little, if any, efficiency gains .. 
Budgetary exercises are often hampered by unrealistic forward estimates, 
typically involving underestimates in relation to operating expenditure 
and overestimates for new capital projects. The PI Cs are "littered literally 
with budget preparation manuals" (Hughes, 2003), prepared by 
consultants under various technical assistance and loan projects 
initiatives. However, due to lack of sustained capacity, which is often 
adversely affected by a large turnover of the key personnel in the 
ministries and departments, appropriate budgetary procedures are often 
not used. As a result, there have been frequent expenditure overruns. 
More stringent internal control systems by strengthening concurrent 
internal audit controls and timely reporting measures to the heads of 
departments are needed. Fiji has introduced the system of enforcing 
accountability of the permanent secretaries of departments/ministries 
through surcharging the culprit bureaucrats, but the statutory penalties 
are rarely enforced. Governance problems hinder the implementation 
of effective public financial management programmes (Browne, 2006). 
In PNG, a series of fiscal consolidation efforts undertaken for continuous 
periods of three to four years, albeit influenced by political business 
cycles, did record some notable achievements in reducing deficits. For 
three years in a row beginning from 2003, PNG ran an overall fiscal 
balance, meeting all domestic and external interest payment obligations. 
However a major policy initiative to reduce the number of departments, 
which would have considerably trimmed recurrent expenditures 
proposed in 2006 was postponed to a later date after the 2007 general 
elections (ADB, 2007). 
Referring to Fiji's experiences, D'Hoore (2006) notes that a tightening of 
public expenditure had been achieved by cuts in the wage and salary 
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bill. The tightening proved unpopular at first, but this was reversed after 
some time. Since consolidation episodes in PICs are often short-lived, 
progress has not been sustained and fiscal adjustment efforts have been 
a failure without any lasting impacts, which is in accordance with the 
findings by Gupta et al. (2004). 
Efficiency in Revenue collection 
Revenue systems in PI Cs need overhauling. Aside from the simplification 
of tax systems, priority should be given to a review of the current tax 
incentives for attracting investments in already flourishing industries 
such as tourism. This in view of the fact that empirical evidence suggests 
that decisions of foreign investors are influenced primarily by factors 
other than tax considerations (Daniel et al., 2006). This however requires 
an emphasis on the nurturing of competitiveness within PIC economies. 
Further, the questionable ministerial discretionary exemptions, which 
are mostly ad hoc, often exercised in PI Cs should be discontinued with. 
In the past, such ad hoc exemptions from custom and import duties 
along with personal income and corporate tax holidays for some specific 
investment activities may have involved elements of corruption. The 
proliferation of exemptions- both statutory and discretionary-
undermines integrity and revenue raising potential (Browne, 2006). 
Countries which are heavily dependent on import and export duties are 
aware of the revenue implications of the introduction of free trade by 
2010, first amongst PICs under the Pacific Island Countries Trade 
Agreement (PICT A), and later with Australia and New Zealand under 
Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER). Kiribati, 
Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu, which are dependent on import 
duties, are likely to suffer the largest impact in terms of reduced tariff 
revenues. A study by Toatu et al. (2004) stressed the need for fiscal 
reforms to address the likely fall in their tax revenues. The recommended 
measures are: (i) conversion of selected import duties to excise taxes, 
which are WTO incompatible; and (ii) broadening the tax system by 
introducing consumption-based taxes, such as value-added taxes (VAT). 
Although about half the countries in the region have introduced VAT, 
an IMF study (Browne, 2006) notes that VAT administration could be 
improved by faster processing of rebates, improved compliance at ports 
(where most revenue is collected) and an upgraded capacity for 
conducting audits. 
Vanuatu, in particular, needs a review of its tax system, which has been 
for 30 years geared towards maintaining a tax haven status to attract 
overseas funds into the country's offshore financial centre (OFC) 
institutions. The gains from OFC institutions are obtained at the cost of 
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revenue lost from the foregone opportunity to tax personal and corporate 
incomes. Vanuatu has to seriously consider introducing direct taxes so 
as to reduce the regressive nature of the current tax regime as well. 
Measures to Counteract Volatility in Non-tax Revenue 
With regard to reducing the volatility in natural resource rent incomes 
for PI Cs, the recommendation by Toatu et al. (2004) is worth considering: 
revenues from fishing licenses and other resource rent incomes should 
be deposited in trust funds such as Kiribati Revenue Rqualisation R0s0rv0 
Fund (RERF) and the Tuvalu Trust Fund (TTF). Presently a multi-year 
contract is negotiated with fishing nations that involve a fixed yearly 
payment over the term of the contract. Since there is an asymmetry of 
information about the likely catch and the likely price, the country owners 
of offshore fishing firms should be asked to bid against each other 
through an auction, which would force them to be more" truthful" about 
their likely catch. In exchange for a five-year fishing contract, firms 
should be asked to bid offering a five-yearly stream of payments, which 
would ensure maximum access fees. It is likely that the present license 
fees are well below the "true resource rent" (Duncan and Temu, 1997). 
PICs have to safeguard the real per capita value of their trust funds by 
limiting the draw-downs. Although Kiribati's parliament has mandated 
that the value of RERF is to be kept constant, there was no requirement 
of a prior approval of the Parliament to draw down from the trust fund. 
Appropriate legislative amendments in the country's Public Finance Act 
may be considered for such parliamentary clearance. 
Re-directing Moneys into Capacity-Building Investments 
Tackling the wage bill, reducing subsidies and discontinuing transfers 
to non-viable state enterprises are effective ways to ensure durable 
expenditure reductions (Alesina et. al., 1995b). Since these adjustments 
would result in substantial annual savings, the resources saved would 
be available for reallocation to capital outlays for productive investments. 
This is also consistent with the persistence of the benefits of fiscal 
adjustment (Gupta et al., 2004). 
Samoa's fiscal reform experiences are relevant in this regard. The 
restructuring of the civil service which began in 2001 was carried through 
until 2003. The programme reduced the number of ministries from 28 to 
13. There were reductions in staffing numbers as well, through natural 
attrition and a freeze on funding for vacant positions, which brought 
down the public sector wage bill well below that of comparable countries 
in the region (Leigh, 2006). The fiscal consolidation measures enabled 
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Samoa to redirect more funds for investment projects. This contributed 
to strengthening fiscal consolidation measures for longer lasting impacts. 
Debt Management 
Domestic borrowing for financing fiscal deficits on a large scale in PICs 
was mainly confined to Fiji and PNG. As noted earlier, total government 
debt in Fiji in 2006, including contingent liabilities, was estimated at 60 
percent of GDP and the country's external debt was around 11 percent of 
GDP. While Fiji's debt rose during the period 2001-2006 to a high figure 
in 2006, PNC' s government debt level decreased over the four-year period 
from 73 percent in 2002 to 42 percent of GDP in 2006. The latter reductions 
were achieved mainly through fiscal consolidation efforts since 2001, 
within a medium-term debt strategy aimed at a gradual replacement of 
external debt by domestic debt and the restructuring of domestic debt 
from short-term treasury bills to long term government bonds. 
Since PI Cs are eligible for borrowing from international funding agencies 
on concessional terms, their public debt was mainly external. Several 
PICs utilised the opportunity in the past to borrow from the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank to finance capital projects. 
When the time arrived for meeting interest and instalment obligations, 
PICs realised that they should have earmarked budgetary savings for 
servicing external debt. Both domestic and external debts require careful 
fiscal management. Additionally, growth in external debt is also subject 
to both interest rate and exchange rate risks. Since external debt servicing 
has to be effected in foreign exchange, PICs have to ensure an adequate 
provision for foreign currency for the purpose. 
There have been some cases of default in the past. Solomon Islands, 
which could not meet debt-servicing obligations on time in the 1990s, 
was subsequently rescued by bilateral donors. The Marshall Islands also 
failed in 2006 to meet debt servicing requirements. Estimates of debt 
sustainability in the Marshall Islands have determined the net present 
value debt to GDP ratio at around 80 percent and debt service as 
proportion of exports at 78 percent. An ADB study (2007) has cautioned 
that even if no new external debt were incurred in 2007, the burden of 
its servicing would increase over the next five years. 
The only way out for the Marshall Islands and other PICs under similar 
circumstances is to resort to fiscal consolidation in a sustained maimer. 
Such fiscal consolidation measures can be effective, as shown by Samoa's 
experiences. In the mid-1990s, Samoa's external debt was more than 100 
percent of GDP. Fiscal consolidation measures unrlertaken by Samoa in 
the late 1990s and carried through the next three years contributed to a 
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gradual reduction in debt stock, which stood at 36 percent of GDP in 2006. 
A debt sustainability analysis undertaken by the IMF in 2005 revealed 
that isolated shocks to the economy would not seriously affect the debt 
ratios but a combination of shocks, such as volatility in aid receipts and 
remittances and hikes in oil price, might raise the debt level (ADB, 2007). 
Vanuatu is the only country in the region which has a restrictive 
legislative provision in regard to the level of external debt. The country's 
Parliament by an act defined the "prudent level" of external debt to 
GDP ratio at 40 percent and debt service to domestic revenue ratio at 8 
percent. It is understood that a similar restrictive legislation was once 
contemplated in Fiji some time ago. PI Cs can consider emulating Vanuatu 
in adopting a similar restrictive legislative measure in containing debt 
levels, which could prove to be useful guidelines in debt management. 
Maintenance of a Competitive Real Exchange Rate 
In the context of rising external debt levels in some PI Cs resulting in higher 
debt-servicing burdens, growth in exports becomes critical. Since fiscal 
deficits give rise to inflationary pressures, which lead to increases in real 
exchange rates, the limited range of export commodities as well as tourism 
services become less competitive to the rest of the world. As PIC 
governments are recipients of substantial amounts of official transfers, 
there is always a possibility of diversion of such proceeds to finance 
recurrent expenditures. The latter would generally include upward 
adjustments in salaries10 and other government consumption of local goods 
and services, with adverse impact on prices of nontradables. The so-called 
"Dutch disease" would then set in pushing the real exchange rate further 
up, with disastrous effects on export earnings.11 
Those PICs which resort to external borrowing for the purpose of 
financing deficits and in particular capital projects, should also be aware 
of such a possibility of diversion of externally borrowed moneys for 
meeting unanticipated and unbudgeted planned new consumption 
expenditures.12 The risks of such possibilities are greater in times of 
political instability, unless the PICs concerned have strong and well 
1° Fiji's fiscal deficit rose to 4.7 percent of GDP in 2006, due to the unanticipated cost of 
living adjustment (COLA) commitments to its salaried civil service employees (RBF, 2006a). 
11 Two recent studies (Rajan and Subramanian, 2005; Raghuram and Subramanian, 2005) 
indicated that some of the aid-receiving countries in Africa were under the influence of 
the "Dutch disease", the effect of which is reflected in the appreciation of real exchange 
rates. Appreciation of real exchange rates has been seen to adversely affect the 
competitiveness of exports, thereby weakening economic growth. 
12 Fiji's international bond issue in September 2006 of US$150 million is a case in point 
with the official announcement that the proceeds of the issue were expected" to be used to 
meet the Government's 2007 budget deficit requirements, and in particular, to finance its 
capital projects" (RBF, 2006c: 12). 
112 
Fiscal Policy and Resilience Building in Pacific Island Countries 
established budgetary control mechanisms in place. Maintenance of a 
competitive real exchange rate is a critical requirement for PICs, which 
resort to external borrowing to supplement domestic resources, since 
future debt-servicing obligations have to be met only through adequate 
export earnings. 
4. Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter presented a review of fiscal performance in PICs in recent 
years. Fiscal vulnerability indicators show that debt levels, both domestic 
and external, are currently not large enough to cause any immediate 
concerns. However, growing annual fiscal deficits experienced by some 
PICs, if not reduced in time, would place them in high-risk situations. 
With impending free trade by 2010 amongst PI Cs, the current tax regimes 
which are heavily dependent on trade taxes will not be sustainable. This 
calls for revenue mobilisation efforts together with fiscal consolidation. 
The following areas need early attention: (i) the introduction of effective 
expenditure control and budget-monitoring systems; (ii) efficient and 
effective mechanisms for generating revenue; (iii) improved measures 
for responding to volatile non-tax and aid revenues; (iv) redirecting fiscal 
resources into capacity building projects by trimming the civil service 
and reducing recurrent expenditures; (v) careful debt management; and 
(vi) improving foreign earnings so as to be able to service external debt. 
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Appendixl 
Fiscal Vulnerability Indicators of Selected Countries 
(Percentage of GDP unless otherwise stated) 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Fiji 
Revenue & Grants 22.1 24.6 25.1 25.8 25.8 
Expenditure & Net Lending 28.6 31.6 31.1 29.1 29.6 
Overall Balance -6.5 -7.0 -6.0 -3.3 -3.8 
Government Debt 44.0 48.0 49.0 53.0 52.0 
External Debt 13.6 13.7 12.2 10.9 11.1 
Current Account Balance -3.5 -1.7 -2.0 -5.0 -4.5 
Intl.Reserves (months of imports) 4.3 3.5 3.1 3.3 3.5 
Exch Rate (against US$) 2.3 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.7 
Kiribati 
Revenue & Grants 118.4 138.7 139.2 106.2 123.2 
Expenditure & Net Lending 135.4 139.3 171.0 149.0 145.8 
Overall Balance 17.0 0.6 -31.9 42.8 -22.6 
External Debt 20.0 16.4 16.0 17.5 19.0 
Current Account Balance 2.0 -1.8 -19.3 -16.3 -9.4 
Intl.Reserves (months of imports) NA NA NA NA NA 
Exch Rate (against US$) 1.9 1.8 1.5 1.4 1.3 
Marshall Islands 
Revenue & Grants 70.1 64.2 65.0 56.2 58.1 
Expenditure & Net Lending 61.9 68.2 54.0 56.6 60.2 
Overall Balance 8.2 -4.0 11.0 -0.4 -2.1 
External Debt 77.0 70.6 71.2 76.4 70.6 
Current Account Balance 8.8 8.6 16.3 4.4 0.5 
Intl.Reserves (months of imports) NA NA NA NA NA 
Exch Rate (against US$) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Micronesia (Federated States of ) 
Revenue & Grants 64.2 71.8 71.8 53.7 51.0 
Expenditure & Net Lending 73.1 65.0 63.8 58.6 54.2 
Overall Balance -8.9 6.8 7.9 -4.8 -3.2 
External Debt 26.3 25.6 25.2 25.8 24.8 
Current Account Balance -5.4 7.3 0.9 -10.6 -12.1 
Intl.Reserves (months of imports) NA NA NA NA NA 
Exch Rate (against US$) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Palau 
Revenue & Grants 43.1 42.4 54.0 54.3 53.6 
Expenditure & Net Lending 64.6 66.3 62.6 61.7 54.2 
Overall Balance -20.3 -28.3 -2.4 -6.9 -3.9 
External Debt 16.2 16.6 15.9 14.0 13.2 
Current Account Balance -9.4 -11.0 9.6 12.6 15.1 
Intl.Reserves (months of imports) NA NA NA NA NA 
Exch Rate (against US$) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Sources: Asian Development Bank (2006), IMF (2006) and author's calculations 
Continued next page. 
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Appendix 1 (continued) 
Fiscal Vulnerability Indicators of Selected Countries 
(Percentage of GDP unless otherwise stated) 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Papua New Guinea 
Revenue & Grants 29.7 27.8 28.2 31.1 28.1 
Expenditure & Net Lending 33.2 31.8 29.4 29.6 26.2 
Overall Balance -3.9 -5.3 -1.6 1.1 1.9 
Government Debt 62.0 73.0 70.0 57.0 51.0 
External Debt 48.7 51.5 43.8 34.3 27.7 
Current Account Balance 6.5 -1.0 4.4 2.1 4.0 
Intl.Reserves (months of imports) 5.7 4.5 5.6 5.8 5.1 
Exchange Rate (against US$) 3.4 3.9 3.5 3.2 3.1 
Samoa 
Revenue & Grants 31.9 33.8 32.8 32.5 40.0 
Expenditure & Net Lending 34.3 35.9 33.4 33.4 40.6 
Overall Balance -2.3 -2.1 -0.6 -0.9 -0.6 
Domestic Debt 61.0 59.0 53.0 50.0 48.0 
External Debt 61.4 62.0 59.6 51.5 48.1 
Current Account Balance 0.1 -0.6 2.9 4.4 2.2 
Intl.Reserves (months of imports) 3.6 4.2 3.4 3.5 3.9 
Exch Rate (against US$) 3.4 3.5 3.2 2.9 2.7 
Solomon Islands 
Revenue & Grants 23.5 18.8 37.6 48.9 48.5 
Expenditure & Net Lending 36.2 29.8 39.5 40.6 49.0 
Overall Balance -12.7 -11.0 -1.9 8.3 -0.5 
Government Debt 82.0 97.0 99.0 87.0 78.0 
External Debt 49.0 67.0 70.6 62.0 61.4 
Current Account Balance -12.8 -7.2 1.3 12.5 -10.8 
Intl.Reserves (months of imports) 2.8 2.1 3.6 5.7 4.7 
Exch Rate (against US$) 5.6 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 
Tonga 
Revenue & Grants 27.5 29.9 27.3 27.5 26 
Expenditure & Net Lending 29 31.3 30.4 26.2 25.8 
Overall Balance -1.5 -1.5 -3.1 1.3 0.1 
Domestic Debt 68 72 68 62 53 
External Debt 40.4 46.3 43.9 40.9 35.6 
Current Account Balance -9.2 4.9 -3 4 -2.2 
Intl.Reserves (months of imports) 1.8 2.8 2 4.8 4 
Exch Rate (against US$) 1.97 2.18 2.19 2.04 1.94 
Vanuatu 
Revenue & Grants 20.9 21 20.1 21.9 22.3 
Expenditure & Net Lending 24.6 25 21.8 21 21.2 
Overall Balance -3.7 -4.1 -1.7 0.9 1 
Public Sector Debt 
D0met:.l1c Del>l 38 41 41 38 37 
External Debt 29.7 28.2 26.1 24.6 23.4 
Current Account Balance 2 -9 -10.2 -9.5 -7.1 
Intl.Reserves (months of imports) 3.1 5.2 4.3 4.3 4.8 
Exch Rate (against US$) 145.3 139.1 122.2 111.9 109.05 
118 
